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Reflections on Shaffer v. Heitner
By JOSEPH P. ZAMMIT*
The institution of quasi-in-rem jurisdiction has outlived its usefulness. Its value as an escape from the strictures of a discarded
territorial theory is gone. Its continued survival only beclouds
jurisdictional thinking and conflicts with significant due process
concerns. The time has come to abolish jurisdictional attachment
and to approach all jurisdictional problems in terms of "minimum
contacts." By so doing, we may hope to achieve results that are
predicated upon a rational process of weighing relevant interests
and not upon purely fortuitous circumstances.
The law of in personam jurisdiction2 has evolved dramatically since the
enunciation of purely territorial criteria more than a century ago in Pennoyer
v. Neff. 3 As the states broadened their jurisdiction over nonresident defend4
ants, the Supreme Court decreed in InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington
that "due process requires . . . that in order to subject a defendant to a
judgment in personam, if he be not present within the forum, he have
certain minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does
not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.' " Until
the Court decided Shaffer v. Heitner6 in 1977, however, no similar trails
were blazed in the law of actions quasi-in-rem. 7 Such actions have been
utilized in the past both for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a
judgment and of compelling the presence of a nonresident defendant in the

forum.
* A.B., 1968, Fordham University; J.D., 1971, Harvard University; LL.M., 1974, New
York University. Associate Professor of Law, St. John's University.
1. Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?,49 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 668, 683 (1975), cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977).
2. In personam jurisdiction empowers a court to render judgments that are personally
binding on the parties involved. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD,CIVIL PROCEDURE 23-4 (2d ed. 1977).

3. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "The authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the
territorial limits of the State in which it is established." Id. at 720.
4. 326 U.S. 310 (1945).
5. Id. at 316.
6. 433 U.S. 186 (1977).
7. An action quasi-in-rem is one brought to enforce a personal liability of the defendant,
where the property attached served as the basis of jurisdiction; any judgment obtained must be
limited to the value of such property. F. JAMES & G. HAzARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 629 (2d ed.
1977).
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The Shaffer appellants brought suit in the Delaware courts challenging
the constitutionality of a Delaware statute that permitted courts to compel
the appearance of a nonresident defendant by the seizure and sequestration
of any or all of his Delaware property. 8 The statute further provided that if
the defendant failed to enter a general appearance in the action, or otherwise
defaulted, his property could be sold to satisfy the plaintiff's demand. 9
Availing himself of another Delaware statute, which fixed that state as the
situs of ownership for capital stock of all Delaware corporations regardless
of the physical location of the certificates,' 0 the plaintiff obtained jurisdiction over twenty-one nonresident defendants in a derivative action by
placing "stop-transfer" orders on the books of Greyhound Corporation. The
defendants made a special appearance to attack jurisdiction, but their motion
to quash was denied.I Upholding the constitutionality of the statute, the
Delaware Supreme Court rejected appellants' argument that such sequestration offended the "minimum contacts" criterion for jurisdiction. "There are
significant constitutional question at issue here," the court agreed, "but
we say at once that we do not deem the rule of InternationalShoe to be one
12
of them."
The court focused instead on appellants' contention that the sequestra8. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974) provides:
If it appears in any complaint filed in the Court of Chancery that the defendant or any one or
more of the defendants is a nonresident of the State, the Court may make an order directing
such nonresident defendant or defendants to appear by a day certain to be designated. Such
order shall be served on such nonresident defendant or defendants by mail or otherwise, if
practicable, and shall be published in such manner as the Court directs, not less than once a
week for 3 consecutive weeks. The Court may compel the appearance of the defendant by the
seizure of all or any part of his property, which property may be sold under the order of the
Court to pay the demand of the plaintiff, if the defendant does not appear, or otherwise
defaults. Any defendant whose property shall have been so seized and who shall have entered a
general appearance in the cause may, upon notice to the plaintiff, petition the Court for an order
releasing such property or any part thereof from the seizure. The Court shall release such
property unless the plaintiff shall satisfy the Court that because of other circumstances there is
a reasonable possibility that such release may render it substantially less likely that plaintiff will
obtain satisfaction of any judgment secured. If such petition shall not be granted, or if no such
petition shall be filed, such property shall remain subject to seizure and may be sold to satisfy
any judgment entered in the cause. The Court may at any time release such property or any part
thereof upon the giving of sufficient security.
See generally Folk & Moyer, Sequestration in Delaware:A Constitutional4nalysis,73 COLUM.
L. REV. 749 (1973).
9. DEL. CODE tit. 10, § 366(a) (1974).
10. DEL. CODE tit. 8, § 169 (1974) provides:
For all purposes of title, action, attachment, garnishment and jurisdiction of all courts held in
this State, but not for the purpose of taxation, the situs of the ownership of the capital stock of
all corporations existing under the laws of this State, whether organized under this chapter or
otherwise, shall be regarded as in this State.
11. Greyhound Corp. v. Heitner, 361 A.2d 225, 229 (Del. 1976).
12. Id.
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tion statute violated the procedural due process requirements established by
Sniadach v. Family FinanceCorp. ,13 Fuentes v. Shevin , 14 Mitchell v. W.T.
Grant Co. 15 and North Georgia Finishing,Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc. ,16 because
it did not provide defendants with notice or an opportunity for a hearing
prior to the seizure of their stock. The Delaware Supreme Court distinguished these cases, however, on the ground that they involved creditordebtor attachments rather than attachments designed to secure the court's
jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant. 17 Observing that notice would
give the defendant an opportunity to defeat jurisdiction by transferring title
or removing his property from the state, the court concluded that seizure
under this statute was an "extraordinary situation" that was exempted from
the Fuentes requirements.18
The United States Supreme Court reversed, bringing all actions in rem
within the "minimum contacts" strictures of InternationalShoe and effectively abrogating quasi-in-rem jurisdiction as a separate conceptual category. The Court held:
The fiction that an assertion of jurisdiction over property is anything but an assertion of jurisdiction over the owner of the property supports an ancient form without substantial modem justification. Its continued acceptance would serve only to allow state
court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.
13. 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (invalidating Wisconsin statute that authorized garnishment of
wages at the request of a creditor's lawyer before trial without any opportunity for the wage
earner to be heard or to offer a defense).
14. 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (invalidating Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes).
15. 416 U.S. 600 (1974) (upholding Louisiana prejudgment writ allowing sequestration of
property to forestall waste or alienation upon plaintiff's affidavit and posting of bond).
Sniadach was distinguished in Mitchell because the Louisiana writ was issued by a judge and
there was an immediate procedure for a post-seizure hearing, whereas the Wisconsin statute
gave no notice, no opportunity for a hearing and required no judicial participation in garnishment of the debtor's wages. Id. at 614-16.
16. 419 U.S. 601 (1975) (invalidating a Georgia garnishment statute that permitted prejudgment seizure of property upon the affidavit of plaintiff or his lawyer, without notice or a
hearing).
17. 361 A.2d at 232.
18. Id. at 231-32. "There are 'extraordinary situations' that justify postponing notice and
opportunity for a hearing," the Fuentes court acknowledged; it cautioned, however, that
"[t]hese situations. . . must be truly unusual." 407 U.S. at 90. Such "extraordinary" circumstances have historically included approval of the summary seizure of property to collect the
internal revenue of the United States, Phillips v. Commissioner, 283 U.S. 589 (1931), to meet
the needs of a national war effort, United States v. Pfitsch, 256 U.S. 547, 549-50 (1921); Stoehr
v. Wallace, 255 U.S. 239, 245 (1921); Central Union Trust Co. v. Garvan, 254 U.S. 554, 566
(1921), to protect against the economic disaster of a bank failure, Fahey v. Mallonee, 332 U.S.
245 (1947), to protect the public from misbranded drugs, Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry,
Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950), and to protect the public from contaminated food, North American
Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908).
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We therefore conclude that all assertions of state court jurisdiction must be evaluated according to the standards set forth in
InternationalShoe and its progeny.19
While representing an overdue reevaluation of the basic fairness of a court's
assertion of jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant, 2° Shaffer leaves
several related jurisdictional questions unanswered. This commentary will
discuss some of the implications of Shaffer with respect to the uses of
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction. First, the article examines the use of quasi-in-rem
rather than in personam actions to secure satisfaction of judgment, even
when minimum contacts are present. Second, the use of quasi-in-rem
provisions to bring nonresident defendants within the jurisdictional reach of
the state when minimum contacts are not present, as in Shaffer, is discussed. In this regard, the commentary will examine the continuing validity
of attachments under the New York high court case of Seider v. Roth,21
which involved attachment of an insurance company's obligation to defend
a nonresident defendant in a local action.
I.

Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction to Obtain Security for
Satisfaction of Judgment

Even in states that have broad long-arm statutes, the plaintiff might
prefer to act by a quasi-in-rem action to guarantee the satisfaction of any
judgment rendered against the defendant. In the wake of Sniadach, and
prior to Shaffer, the constitutionality of such statutes came under scrutiny in
a number of lower federal court cases. For example, in 1971, the district
court in Lebowitz v. ForbesLeasing & Finance Corp. 22 upheld Delaware's
foreign attachment 23 procedure. Although the due process standards of
notice and a hearing established by Sniadach and its progeny had not been
met, the court refused to quash the jurisdictional attachment because it
constituted an "extraordinary situation. "24 Whatever validity this distinc19. 433 U.S. at 212.
20. See Zammit, Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction:Outmoded and Unconstitutional?, 49 ST.
JOHN'S L. REv. 668, 683 (1975), cited in Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186, 200 (1977).
21. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
22. 326 F. Supp. 1335 (E.D.Pa. 1971). See also Tucker v.Burton, 319 F. Supp. 567
(D.D.C. 1970).
23. Foreign attachment originated near the end of the 13th century in the Law Merchant,
which designated the rules and customs used by merchants and traders. At that time foreign
attachment was the remedy employed by London merchants to collect debts from foreign
merchants.
This is a writ, not issuing out of chancery, but out of the court of common pleas, being
grounded on the non-appearance of the defendant at the return of the original writ; and
thereby the sheriff is commanded to attach him, by taking gage, that is, certain of his
goods, which he shall forfeit if he doth not appear; or by making him find safepledges
or sureties who shall be amerced in case of his non-appearance.
3 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 280 (1765) (footnote omitted).
24. 326 F. Supp. at 1348-54. See also Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94, 110 (1921).
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tion may have had formerly, it is indefensible in light of Shaffer. Because
minimum contacts are now required for quasi-in-rem actions, the only
purpose served by such jurisdictional attachments is that of obtaining security. Thus, to refuse to apply the Sniadach standards to a quasi-in-rem action
brought to secure a judgment would be to recognize a sham.2
The Supreme Court in Shaffer, however, accepted the proposition that
when Sniadach standards are met, a state may exercise jurisdiction over
property for the limited purpose of securing a judgment in another forum in
which minimum contacts are present, even if the former state lacks such

contacts.26 This exception is illustrated by the recent holding in Carolina
Power & Light Co. v. Uranex.27 The plaintiff in that action, a North
Carolina company, was involved in a contract dispute with a French defendant. The contract provided for New York arbitration; while such arbitration
was in progress the plaintiff proceeded ex parte to attach an eighty-five

million dollar debt owed to the defendant by a California-based corporation.
The debt had no relationship to the litigation except as a potential source of
satisfaction of the judgment. The French defendant's limited contacts with
California would not have supported the assertion of in personam jurisdiction there. Nevertheless, the court in CarolinaPower& Light Co. relied
on Shaffer to find that " 'fair play and substantial justice' include consideration of both the jeopardy to plaintiff's ultimate recovery and the
limited nature of the jurisdiction sought .
,,-28
Thus, when this form of
judicial escrow is available, old line security attachment is merely preserved

in an alternate form.
25. The Del-aware Supreme Court in Heitner and the courts in Lebowitz and Tucker relied
on citations in the Sniadach case to an older decision, Ownbey v. Morgan, 256 U.S. 94 (1921).
In Ownbey, the Supreme Court upheld a Delaware foreign attachment statute that required a
defendant whose property had been attached to file a bond before entering an appearance. The
Shaffer Court commented: "We do not read the recent references to Ownbey a necessarily
suggesting that Ownbey is consistent with more recent decisions interpreting the Due Process
Clause." 433 U.S. at 194 n.10.
26. 433 U.S. at 210.
27. Carolina Power & Light Co. v. Uranex, reported in 46 U.S.L.W. 2195 (N.D. Cal.,
Sept. 26, 1977).
28. Id. As the Court in Shaffer explained:
The primary rationale for treating the presence of property as a sufficient basis for
jurisdiction to adjudicate claims over which the State would not have jurisdiction if
InternationalShoe applied is that a wrongdoer "should not be able to avoid payment
of his obligations by the expedient of removing his assets to a place where he is not
subject to an in personam suit." . . . This justification, however, does not explain
why jurisdiction should be recognized without regard to whether the property is
- present in the State because of an effort to avoid the owner's obligations. Nor does it
support jurisdiction to adjudicate the underlying claim. At most, it suggests that a
State in which property is located should have jurisdiction to attach that property, by
use of proper procedures, as security for a judgment being sought in a forum where the
litigation can be maintained consistently with InternationalShoe.
433 U.S. at 210.
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Quasi-in-Rem Jurisdiction as a "Judicial Long-Arm Statute"

A nonresident defendant may have sufficient "minimum contacts"
with a state to satisfy the due process standard of InternationalShoe, 29 but
unless the state's own threshold criteria for jurisdiction are met, an action
cannot be maintained. Long-arm statutes that provide for jurisdiction on
grounds other than physical presence have been enacted in many states.
Typically, these statutes permit jurisdiction when the defendant has (1)
transacted any business within the state; (2) committed any tortious act
within the state; (3) contracted to insure interests or risks within the state; or
when he (4) owns real estate within the state. 30 California permits "jurisdiction on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of

the United States.'

'31

Lacking a sufficiently broad long-arm provision, a state court might
attempt to utilize a quasi-in-rem statute to obtain personal jurisdiction over a
nonresident defendant where minimum contacts are otherwise present. This
situation must be distinguished from those cases in which a quasi-in-rem
statute is employed for a similar purpose but in which claims to the property
itself are at issue. In the former situation, the quasi-in-rem provision is
utilized solely to compel the defendant's appearance in the forum in order to
defend against a cause of action unrelated to the property. Thus, the only
distinction between this type of quasi-in-rem action and the one presented in
Shaffer is that because minimum contacts are present, due process standards
are met: the defendant has ties with the forum other than the mere presence
of property, and maintenance of the action does not offend constitutional
safeguards. 32 Shaffer therefore has not tolled the death knell for actions in
which quasi-in-rem statutes are utilized to compel personal jurisdiction,
except where the nonresident defendant's only link with the forum state is
the fortuitous presence of his property within its borders.
As a result, attachments of an insurer's contractual obligation to defend, approved by the New York Court of Appeals in Seider v. Roth, may
now be invalid. The plaintiffs in Seider, who were injured in an automobile
accident in Vermont, gained New York jurisdiction over the Canadian
defendant by attaching his automobile liability insurance policy. Upholding
the constitutionality of the attachment, the New York Court of Appeals
29. 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
30. E.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, § 17 (Smith-Hurd 1968); N.Y. Civ. PRAC. LAW § 302

(McKinney 1972); MONT. R. Civ. PRoc. 4(b) (Smith 1965).
31. CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE § 410.10 (West 1973).
32. The same constitutional guarantees would measure the compatibility of an action with

"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice," whether jurisdiction is quasi-in-rem or
in personam. 326 U.S. at 316.
33. 17 N.Y.2d 111, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966).
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stated: "Jurisdiction is properly acquired . . . since the policy obligation is
a debt owed to the defendant by the insurer, the latter being regarded as a
resident of this State [by virtue of doing business in New York]." ' 34 The
New York high court reviewed the soundness of its holding in Seider and
the constitutionality of such attachments the following year in Simpson v.
Loehmann 3 In that case, the court adhered to its position in Seider:
[W]e perceive no denial of due process since the presence of that
debt in this State. . .-contingent or inchoate though it may berepresents sufficient of a property [sic] right in the defendant to
furnish the nexus with, and the interest in, New York to
36 empower
its courts to exercise an in rem jurisdiction over him.
Such disregard of the defendant's own contacts with the forum state
should make jurisdiction untenable under Shaffer, because attaching an
insurer's "debt" 37 to a policyholder is merely an application of quasi-in-rem
principles to intangibles. The fact that more recent New York cases have
restricted the use of Seider attachments to resident plaintiffs 38 does not alter
the conclusion compelled by Shaffer: jurisdiction should be predicated on
the "minimum contacts" of the defendant, not on the residence of the
plaintiff.
A different result might be reached, however, if New York's Seider
attachments are viewed as a judicially created direct action statute against
the insurance company. For instance, in Minichiello v. Rosenberg,39 motions to dismiss two separate actions based on Seider attachments for lack of
34. Id. at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102.
35. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967).
36. Id. at 310, 234 N.E.2d at 671, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 636 (citations omitted).
The historical limitations on both in personam and in rem jurisdiction, with their rigid
tests, are giving way to a more realistic and reasonable evaluation of the respective
rights of plaintiffs, defendants and the State in terms of fairness. . . . Such an
evaluation requires a practical appraisal of the situation of the various parties rather
than an emphasis upon somewhat magical and medieval concepts of presence and
power.
Id. at 311, 234 N.E.2d at 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 637 (citations omitted).
37. In Simpson, Judge Burke dissented on grounds that no debt arose until a suit was filed
because the insurer's promise to defend was contingent thereon. Burke felt that plaintiffs
should not be able to bootstrap jurisdiction by the attachment of an inchoate contractual
obligation. Id. at 316-21, 234 N.E.2d at 675-79, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 642-47 (Burke, J., dissenting).
38. See Donawitz v. Danek, 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d 253, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977)
(New Jersey plaintiff barred from attaching New Jersey physician's medical malpractice
liability insurance in New York to gain New York jurisdiction). See also Farrell v. Piedmont
Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 840 (1969), in which New York
resident administrators of the estates of thirteen nonresidents who were killed in an airplane
collision over North Carolina were barred from using Seider attachments of defendant airlines'
liability insurance. "[W]here there are absolutely no New York contacts except for the doing of
business by the insurers, we have the gravest difficulty in understanding how New York could
constitutionally call upon the insureds to respond or could impair by attachment rights the
insurers would otherwise have to settle with other claimants." Id. at 816.
39. 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969).
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jurisdiction were denied. Reasoning that New York could validly enact a
direct action statute, the circuit court concluded that the judiciary can
achieve the same result by entertaining suits in which jurisdiction is based
on the attachment of defendant's liability insurance. As in Seider, the
insurance company in Minichiello was considered the real party in interest.
In the 1977 case of Donawitz v. Danek,4° however, concurring Judge Jasen
questioned the use of the Seider rationale in lieu of a direct action statute.
"Judicial creation of a direct action statute is a contradiction in terms.
Courts do not, or at least should not, legislate." 41 Jasen's concurrence also
rebutted the majority's contention that the legislature's failure to enact a
direct action statute signified its approval of Seider. The legislature had
enacted such a statute, he noted, only to have it vetoed by the governor
because of a drafting deficiency. 42 Moreover, recent New York cases take
the position that Seider is incompatible with Shaffer. In Torres v. Towmotor Div. of CaterpillarInc. 43 for example, the district court held that
"quasi in rem jurisdiction predicated on a Seider attachment is but a smoke
screen for the ancient form of Harris based jurisdiction whose 'continued
acceptance would serve only to allow [the assertion of] state court jurisdiction that is fundamentally unfair to the defendant.' 4 Plaintiff's motion
for an attachment order, which was solely for the purpose of gaining quasiin-rem jurisdiction over a New Jersey defendant who had no contacts with
New York, was accordingly denied. 45 It should be noted that Torres was a
46
diversity action in which the court sought to apply New York law.
Rejecting routine application of stare decisis, as the New York courts had
done in the past, 47 the court expressed the opinion that "the New York
Courts would perceive the momentous Shaffer decision as supplying the
'reason and sense of justice' for effecting a change of the Court's perfunc48
tory affirmance of Seider."
Other New York courts have approved the district court's point of view
in part. In Kennedy v. Deroker,49 the New York Supreme Court dismissed
40. 42 N.Y.2d 138, 366 N.E.2d J53, 397 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1977).
41. Id. at 147, 366 N.E.2d at 259, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
42. Id. at 149, 366 N.E.2d at 260, 397 N.Y.S.2d at 600.

43. No. 77 C 1810 (E.D.N.Y., filed Nov. 18, 1977).
44. Id., memorandum and order at 36.
45. The court refused to impute the minimum contacts of the defendant's insurance
company to the defendant. "[lit cannot be reasonably argued that by entering into a contract of
insurance with a company doing business in New York, a nonresident defendant thereby
explicitly or impliedly consents to have the insurance company's New York contacts imputed
to him." Id. at 32.
46. Id. at 5.
47. Id. at 34.
48. Id. at 45-46 n.17, citing Silver v. Great American Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 363, 278
N.E.2d 619, 623, 328 N.Y.S.2d 398, 404 (1972).
49. 398 N.Y.S.2d 628 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
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an action based on a Seider attachment, 5° reasoning that:
The act of the Massachusetts resident in purchasing a contract of
liability insurance in Massachusetts to cover his Massachusetts
based automobile establishes in and of itself no minimum contact
with New York even though the insurance company is itself in
5
New York and subject to its process for jurisdictional purposes. '
The court used the same rationale to grant a motion for dismissal of another
action in which jurisdiction was based on the attachment of a medical
malpractice insurance policy that had been issued to a nonresident third
party defendant. In Katz v. Umansky,5 2 the court observed: "Jurisprudentially, the Supreme Court in Shaffer extended the criterion of the minimum
contacts 'concept of in personam jurisdiction to quasi in rem jurisdiction
. . .' so that the fortuitous presence of defendant's property in New York
will no longer justify its seizure in order to create quasi rem [sic] jurisdiction
. ... ,, The New York Court of Appeals' reluctant adherence to Seider,
the New York legislature's unfruitful attempt to overrule the case by statute,
and the recent New York decisions that abandon Seider's controversial
method of asserting jurisdiction, foretell the death of the Seider concept of
54
quasi-in-rem jurisdiction.

Conclusion
The final question left unanswered by the Shaffer decision brings us
full circle. In the area of in personam jurisdiction, International Shoe
undermined the conceptual structure of territoriality created by Pennoyer v.
Neff. 55 In Shaffer, the mere presence of property within the jurisdiction was
50. The court could have dismissed the action on the ground that ihe plaintiff, an Alaska
resident, was not entitled to invoke the Seider doctrine, which has been limited to resident
plaintiffs. See note 38 and accompanying text supra.But because the plaintiff asserted that she
maintained both New York and Alaska residences, the court felt compelled to treat her as a
New York resident. 398 N.Y.S.2d at 629.
51. 398 N.Y.S.2d at 630. The court did not, however, consider the court of appeals' recent
interpretation of its holding in Seider to establish a judicial direct action "statute." "Since this
motion is directed only to the status of the Massachusetts owner and driver as defendants in the
action, the court has not considered the recent declaration of the Court of Appeals that its
holding in Seider v. Roth established by judicial fiat a direct action against the insurance
company in a case such as this." Id. See notes 39-42 and accompanying text supra.
52. 399 N.Y.S.2d 412 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
53. Id. at 416 (citations omitted). The court specifically rejected plaintiff's assertion that
Seider and its progeny are predicated on a direct action theory, concluding to the contrary that
that line of cases employed traditional quasi-in-rem jurisdiction analysis. Id. See notes 39-42
and accompanying text supra.
54. See notes 49-53 and accompanying text supra. Such an opportunity was also presented by O'Connor v. Lee-Hy Paving Co., No. 76 C 1853 (E.D.N.Y. Oct. 14,1 1977), a wrongful
death action certified to the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit for guidance in applying
Shaffer.
55. 95 U.S. 714 (1877).
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rejected as an appropriate basis for personal jurisdiction in favor of the
minimum contacts approach of InternationalShoe. What remains then is
the question of whether the presence of the person in the forum is in itself a
sufficient basis for the exercise of jurisdiction. That it is sufficient is
suggested by the minimum contacts requirement articulated in International
Shoe for defendants "not present within. . . the forum. "56
The absurdity of the presence of property or the person alone as a
57
predicate for jurisdiction is illustrated by cases like Grace v. MacArthur.
In that case, the Arkansas plaintiffs gained Arkansas jurisdiction over an
Illinois corporation by having its controlling stockholder, chairman of the
board and president, and also a defendant, personally served with a copy of
the summons and complaint "on the Braniff Airplane, Flight No. 337,
nonstop flight from Memphis, Tenn. to Dallas, Texas,. . . at 5:16 P.M. at
which time the said airplane was in the Eastern District of Arkansas and
directly above Pine Bluff, Arkansas.
...
58 The service of a summons on
a nonresident defendant during such a fleeting stay in the state may be even
more fortuitous than his ownership of property there. While such cases are
rare and the problem may be obviated by the application of the doctrine of
forum non conveniens, 59 this is not always true, particularly if the plaintiff is
60
a resident of the forum.
Logic and consistency would seem to require that minimum contacts
accompany physical presence as a predicate for the exercise of jurisdiction.
Whether the final step will be taken, abandonment of this most ancient base
for the exercise of jurisdiction, indeed the only one recognized by the
common law in the absence of statute, 61 remains to be seen. The Supreme
Court in Shaffer has, however, hinted at the answer: " '[T]raditional notions of fair play and substantial justice' can be as readily offended by the
perpetuation of ancient forms that are no longer justified as by the adoption
of new procedures that are inconsistent with the basic values of our constitu62
tional heritage."
56. 326 U.S. at 316.
57. 170 F. Supp. 442 (E.D. Ark. 1959). But see F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE
628 n.7 (2d ed. 1977), in which it is suggested that the transaction sued on in Grace occurred in
Arkansas.
58. 170 F. Supp. at 443.
59. See F. JAMES & G. HAZARD, CIVIL PROCEDURE 628 (2d ed. 1977).
60. Cf. Silver v. Great American Ins. Co., 29 N.Y.2d 356, 278 N.E.2d 619, 328 N.Y.S.2d

398 (1972) (Application of the doctrine of forum non conveniens "should turn on considerations
of justice, fairness and convenience and not solely on the residence of one of the parties." Id.
at 361, 278 N.E.2d at 622, 328 N.Y.S.2d at 402).
61. Cf. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945).
62. 433 U.S. at 212.

